Near the end of the 1990 film The Hunt for Red October the US National Security Advisor peers over the rhyme of his glasses at the Soviet ambassador and asks: "Andrey … you've lost another submarine? ”
That moment might feel familiar to anyone following the tragic story of the Boeing 737 MAX. A new flight control problem with the jet was revealed this week, reported by The Air Current as being categorized as "catastrophic" by the US Federal Aviation Administration, which seems to have disagreed with Boeing about the severity of the issue in what feels like another hubris driving this tragedy.
Back in April when the MAX grounding was new, I opined at the Aircraft Interiors Expo that the jet would probably not be back before the next setpiece cabin interiors event, the APEX Expo in September. This mirrored comments made by #PaxEx industry stakeholders to RGN editor Mary Kirby on the show floor . Now, with this latest problem and the additional time required, I wonder if that estimation was too optimistic.
Certainly, some airlines are now changing their operational plans for the MAX that out and beyond.
At this point 737 MAX returned to service before next year's Aircraft Interiors Expo in April. It's even more likely that we won't see it flying everywhere, because of the number of global regulators that need to sign off on it.
If I reported in RGN last week at the Paris Air Show, Boeing new aircraft around the regulators who certify its new and incrementally evolved aircraft in the 737 family, in this case the passenger-to-freighter 737-800BCF.
Boeing identifies the US, European, Chinese and Russian regulators, although this is a different set to the four regulators reported by Bloomberg to coordinate the restoration of the MAX to service. That list from the US, Europe, Canada and Brazil as the regulators of Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier and Embraer.
It's very clear that the 737 MAX is going to be a matter of much scrutiny, and it seems To me that the FAA may have acknowledged at least internally that it made serious mistakes in the certification of the aircraft.
That acknowledgment would have substantial wider implications, not least because the agency now needs itself just domestically but internationally.
I would expect the FAA to go above not only its previous level or scrutiny ̵
This approach would be smart for the FAA. It would be good for those who care about safe aircraft, as long as the approach reverts to "a reasonable standard" once the heat is off rather than falling to the problematic previous level of scrutiny. It is, if all works out, likely to be good for the MAX that will be the most scrutinized aircraft in history.
But the "if it all works out" is the kicker. This "beyond reproach" approach from the FAA will flag # 737MAX issues that might have been dealt with via Service Bulletins and / or Airworthiness Directives in normal service, without groundings.
I am entirely in favor of it doing so, I should say. Safety is crucial, as is restoring regulatory trust. But the wider implications for the MAX and for Boeing are, every time one of these # 737MAX certification issues arises, it adds months (plural) to the amount of time before the FAA is willing to sign off the MAX and the aircraft starts be ungrounded.
Every month that goes by produces dozens more MAX aircraft that airlines were expecting in their fleets over the busy northern hemisphere summer months, stored everywhere from boneyards to Boeing employee parking lots.
This is a major market externality, which could well cause a bubble-burst situation within the airline industry, particularly around narrowbodies. The industry is relatively fortunate, in a way that several airlines have already lost, their aircraft able to be reassigned to the MAX. Indeed, this demand for aircraft is likely to drive other airlines to the brink, their more valuable to other carriers than their operators.
Any bursting of an industry bubble would not be good news for the MAX, for Boeing, or for the rest of the industry.
The process of ungrounding the MAX is also key here. For a start, we are entering the northern hemisphere summer holiday season, and in many key countries work simply stops as key people go on holiday. Even if every person required only takes three weeks' holiday (a relative baseline in Europe), these three weeks are spread out over July and August, and now in September for those without a need to deliver children back to school and with a commensurate ability
Even the out-of-office auto-replicas are flying, the regulators need to do their work one-by-one. The FAA would unground the MAX first while showing its work to other regulators for their review.
Having four regulators in the behind early will help, but there are others to content with: at a first set, China, Indonesia and Ethiopia, with Australia, Qatar, Singapore and the UAE also early requirements.
These global regulators are individual agencies, with individual agency , governmental, national, regional and international agendas. Even a noteworthy agency with only the interest of flying public at heart (and want to be seen) to ensure that it is scrutinizing the 737 MAX – and, crucially, the FAA – to a "beyond reproach" level.  But that notional agency does not exist. For a start, Indonesia and Ethiopia, as the states of registration of the two crashed MAX aircraft, have national agendas.
China, too, has multiple interests that are vital to consider. Its aim to grow its aviation industry means that it has an interest in understanding how the certification process works, and indeed it has an interest in growing the role of the CAAC as a regional and global regulator.
More widely, the Chinese aviation industry is in the process of developing its manufacturing capabilities with first-run aircraft like the ARJ21, C919 and soon the C929. It would not be necessary to find out that there are interests within China that would gain from vital parts of the process if Boeing presently sees it.
And, indeed, the wider geopolitical context is likely to cause problems for Boeing, some of which are out of control but many of which would be of its own making. The US largest exporter would always be inextricably linked here.
But it does not help Boeing that its pro-trump strategy and corporate application of a capricious and volatile White House with objectively bizarre views on aviation link the company even more closely to the US government than in previous years.
All of this is a problem for Boeing, and every month that the cold stasis is on new programs that results from the MAX's grounding is another that the airframe cannot launch the NMA mid-market airplane – and, by extension, the FSA, the 737 replacement.
Running two new airplane projects would be complex to the point of foolhardiness for any manufacturer, but given Boeing's proven history with the 787 and 737 MAX design and entry into service problems, it would be especially unwise.
A scenario where the NMA f the wayide, Boeing takes a hit on the shrinking lower-middle of the market that the A321 is running away with until the can build the FSA, and the airframe ends up figuring out some way to make the 787-8 appealing to the upper end is looking less and less left-field. As I said on the Runway Girl Network #PaxEx Podcast this week, I can't help feeling that we're talking about the 737 MAX return to the air as inevitable, which rings of Boeing and its products being 'too big to fail'. That didn't work out for the financial industry, and I'm talking about half of the global airliner manufacturing industry in the same kind of way.